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I. INTRODUCTION
With the attention of policymakers worldwide focused on environmental problems that transcend national borders and reach even
to the heavens’ heights, an examination of property rights solutions to
global problems is appropriate. The institution of private property is
1
an effective way of dealing with many environmental problems.
However, before the efficacy of property rights solutions to global
environmental problems can be addressed, the prospects for the
emergence of property rights in the global commons must be analyzed. Predictions about the effectiveness of a property rights regime
for the global commons are of little relevance, if such a regime cannot
arise or is unlikely to arise at the global level. Thus, this article is
about institutions and how they evolve—specifically, how the institution of private property emerges and evolves and whether or not the
institution might emerge at the global level. This inquiry does not
concern property rights in their broadest sense; some kind of rights
will surely develop in the global commons.2 Rather, this article addresses the more interesting question regarding the extent to which a

1. See TERRY L. ANDERSON & DONALD R. LEAL, FREE MARKET ENVIRONMENTALISM
(1991); ELIZABETH BRUBAKER, PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE DEFENCE OF NATURE (1995);
DENNIS J. COYLE, PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE CONSTITUTION (1993); J.H. DALES,
POLLUTION, PROPERTY AND PRICES (1968); JAMES V. DELONG, PROPERTY MATTERS: HOW
PROPERTY RIGHTS ARE UNDER ASSAULT—AND WHY YOU SHOULD CARE (1997); WHO
OWNS THE ENVIRONMENT? (Peter J. Hill & Roger E. Meiners eds., 1998).
2. The development of property rights in the global commons involves two issues: the
emergence of a property rights regime and the choice of the property rights regime. The first
issue concerns avoiding the so-called tragedy of the commons, where free access to the commons leads to its overuse and ruination. See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162
SCI. 1243, 1244 (1968). History teaches that some form of control will emerge that will reduce
the scope and severity of possible tragedies. See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property
Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 350 (1967) (theorizing that property arrangements in all societies emerge and evolve in response to changes in technology, relative prices, and other economic
conditions); see generally DOUGLASS C. NORTH, STRUCTURE AND CHANGE IN ECONOMIC
HISTORY (1981) (describing the emergence and evolution of institutions throughout history);
Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315 (1993) (describing the development
and evolution of various land regimes in a variety of settings throughout history). The rationing
mechanism that limits overuse of the commons, however, is often simple command-and-control,
which implies property rights. See Daniel H. Cole, Clearing the Air: Four Propositions about
Property Rights and Environmental Protection, 10 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 103, 111 (1999)
(“What distinguishes transferable pollution ‘rights’ schemes from command-and-control regulations is not that the former are property-based and the latter are not. Command-and-control
involves the (often implicit) assertion of public/state-property rights on environmental goods.
The difference lies in the type and extent of property rights imposed.”). The second issue stems
from the choice of the property rights regime. See Bruce Yandle, The Commons: Tragedy or
Triumph, THE FREEMAN, Apr. 1999, at 30, 32-34 (providing examples and explaining how the
choice of property rights regime either can avoid or hasten the tragedy of the commons).
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future people will develop property institutions that support a liberal
order, one that accommodates efficiency-improving market incentives
and yields wealth-enhancing gains from voluntary trade. In other
words, this article addresses the prospects for the emergence of 3-D
property rights, private rights that can be defined, defended, and di3
vested or transferred.
An analysis of the likelihood that 3-D property rights will emerge
in the global commons of the earth’s atmosphere is informed by the
4
emergence of 3-D environmental rights a little closer to home. This
article uses lessons from human experience with resources on earth to
forecast institutional change in the heavens. Informed by earthly experience, this article seeks to answer the following two questions: (1)
can 3-D property rights emerge for heavenly assets, or the global atmosphere, and (2) how will such property rights emerge?

3. The author expresses appreciation to Richard Stroup, PERC Senior Associate and Professor of Economics at Montana State University, for first suggesting the term “3-D rights” to
him. While not specifically adopting the phrase “3-D rights,” Anderson and Leal provide a
good explanation of 3-D property rights.
The key, therefore, to effective markets in general and free market environmentalism
in particular is the establishment of well-specified and transferable property rights.
When a conservation group purchases a conservation easement on a parcel of land, the
exchange requires that property rights be well defined, enforced, and transferable.
The physical attributes of the resources must be specified in a clear and concise manner; they must be measurable. For example, the rectangular survey system allows us to
define ownership rights over land and clarifies disputes over ownership. The system
may also help us define ownership to the airspace over land, but more questions arise
here because of the fluidity of air and the infinite vertical third dimension above
ground. If property rights to resources cannot be defined, then they obviously cannot
be exchanged for other property rights.
Property rights must also be defendable. A rectangular survey may define surface
rights to land, but conflicts are inevitable if there is no way to defend the boundaries
and prevent other incompatible uses. Barbed wire provided an inexpensive way to defend property rights on the western frontier; locks and chains do the same for parked
bicycles. But enforcing one’s rights to peace and quiet by “fencing out” sound waves
may be more difficult, as will keeping other people’s hazardous wastes out of a
groundwater supply. Whenever the use of property cannot be monitored or enforced,
conflicts are inevitable and trades are impossible.
Finally, property rights must be transferable. In contrast to the costs of measuring and
monitoring resource uses, which are mainly determined by the physical nature of the
property and technology, the ability to exchange is determined largely by the legal environment. Although well-defined and enforced rights allow the owner to enjoy the
benefits of using his property, legal restrictions on the sale of that property preclude
the potential for gains from trade. Suppose that a group of fishermen values water for
fish habitat more highly than farmers value the same water for irrigation. If fishermen
are prohibited from renting or purchasing the water from farmers, then gains from
trade will not be realized and potential wealth will not be created.
ANDERSON & LEAL, supra note 1, at 20-21 (emphasis added).
4. For something of a pessimistic status report on the extent to which market forces and
property rights are seen as components of U.S. environmental policy, see BREAKING THE
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY GRIDLOCK (Terry L. Anderson ed., 1997).
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Part II examines environmental property rights in the abstract
and considers the prospects for expanded trade in such rights. This
part analyzes whether 3-D property rights for heavenly assets, such as
air quality, have existed in the past. Part II then describes the degree
to which 3-D property rights currently exist, finding that most ‘property rights’ markets today trade in regulatory property rather than
private property. Finally, this part explains why political markets often intervene and stifle the emergence of private 3-D rights. Markets
in 3-D property rights are often destroyed by the passage of statutes
and regulations. However, while politics often usurps the common
law creation of 3-D rights, there are reasons that the existence of 3-D
property rights in the global commons may be more likely.
Part III describes the process by which the institution of property
rights emerges and examines specifically how a property rights regime
might emerge for the global atmosphere. Part III begins by describing a simple pattern of property rights development and discusses the
evolution of 3-D property rights in the context of environmental resources. Then, this part examines attempts to protect the ozone layer
and limit greenhouse gas emissions in an effort to identify the extent
to which property rights are evolving in the global commons.
Part IV analogizes to notions of hunter/gatherers and food producers to draw some final conclusions about property rights evolution. This part uses these notions to explain why the global commons
will likely remain a commons for a long time but will eventually yield
to a regime of public and then private property rights.
II. RECOGNIZING 3-D ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS WHEN
WE SEE THEM
With regard to the recognition of 3-D property rights, there are
several questions to consider. First, have 3-D property rights existed
in the past for specific elements of air or water quality and other environmental resources? If so, do 3-D property rights exist now in 2000?
If 3-D rights are possible, what explains their absence in certain contexts and their emergence in others? Examining whether or not 3-D
property rights for resources, such as air quality, exist and under what
circumstances they exist informs predictions for whether such rights
might emerge in the global commons.
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A. Air and Sunlight: Can 3-D Property Rights Exist for Heavenly
Resources?
So, have 3-D property rights ever existed for heavenly assets,
such as air quality? Those who attempt to stay abreast of evolving
environmental law and policy will likely respond to this question by
talking about developments in the latter half of the twentieth cen5
tury. For example, such persons might mention tradable permits for
sulfur dioxide emissions, bring up EPA’s bubble and offset policies,
or discuss the possible market for carbon dioxide emission permits as6
sociated with the Kyoto Protocol. They will likely suggest that tradable rights to use the environment are a very modern concept, rights
that have only recently evolved. However, tradable rights have an
earlier ancestry, as evidenced by the nineteenth century writings of
John Stuart Mill.7
In 1848, John Stuart Mill had this to say about property rights to
air quality:
Air, for example, though the most absolute of necessaries, bears no
price in the market, because it can be obtained gratuitously: to accumulate a stock of it would yield no profit or advantage to any
one; and the laws of its production and distribution are the subject
of a very different study from Political Economy . . . . If it became
customary to sojourn long in places where the air does not naturally
penetrate, as in diving-bells sunk in the sea, a supply of air artificially furnished would, like water conveyed into houses, bear a
price: and if from any revolution in nature the atmosphere became
too scanty for the [sic] consumption, or could be monopolized, air
8
might acquire a very high marketable value.

Although Mill saw very limited prospects for markets in air quality,
he predicted that such markets could indeed emerge.
Mill, however, did not recognize that alienable environmental
rights and markets in those rights did exist at the time he was writing
and, in fact, had existed for centuries. During Mill’s time, English
common law granted 3-D property rights to owners and occupiers of
5. See generally Bruce Yandle, Environmental Regulation: Lessons from the Past and Future Prospects, in BREAKING THE ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY GRIDLOCK, supra note 4, at 140
[hereinafter Yandle, Environmental Regulation].
6. See, e.g., TOM TIETENBERG, ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCE
ECONOMICS 364-75 (4th ed. 1996) [hereinafter TIETENBERG, NATURAL RESOURCE
ECONOMICS]; TOM TIETENBERG, ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS AND POLICY 254-65 (2d ed.
1998) [hereinafter TIETENBERG, ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS].
7. See JOHN S. MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY (London, Longmans, Green
& Co. 1880) (1848).
8. Id. at 4.
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land downwind or downstream from a polluter.9 A landowner had a
cause of action against an upstream or upwind polluter and could enforce his rights by way of an injunction or the provision of damages or
both.10 Therefore, the common law encouraged a market process in
which rightholders and those desiring to consume environmental
11
quality could bargain. If persons wanted to consume environmental
quality (pollute), they could enter into a contract with landowners,
purchasing landowners’ rights to sue for damages or injunctive relief
12
regarding the polluting activity.
In this process of contracting
around the common law rule, specific rights to air and water quality
were defined and transferred from downstream property holders to
13
polluters; common law courts enforced these transferred rights.
Of course, these same environmental rights enforced at common
law conceptually migrated to the United States with English Law.
For years there were no highly articulated auction markets for emission privileges, such as the government-sponsored market for SO2
emission allowances, but there were spontaneous markets for environmental rights. For example, as Davis reports, Wisconsin paper
mills routinely purchased riparian rights and land along rivers affected by paper-making discharge in order to obtain what might be
called environmental rights.14 Furthermore, as early as 1891, land
trusts engaged in the purchase of land and environmental easements.15
Transactions such as these, involving the direct purchase of environmental rights, supplemented the purchase of land for the purpose of
obtaining valuable environmental features.
In 1950, John R. Commons recognized that environmental rights
were indeed part of the bundle of land rights protected at common
law when he wrote:
Scarcity in economics is property in jurisprudence, and the rights
and duties of property are the working rules of sovereignty in control of scarcity. Nobody would ask his government to protect him
9. See BRUCE YANDLE, COMMON SENSE AND COMMON LAW FOR THE ENVIRONMENT:
CREATING WEALTH IN HUMMINGBIRD ECONOMIES 91-93 (1997) [hereinafter YANDLE,
COMMON SENSE AND COMMON LAW].
10. See id.
11. See id. at 92-93.
12. See id. at 93.
13. See Roger Meiners & Bruce Yandle, Common Law and the Conceit of Modern Environmental Policy, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 923, 946 (1999); Peter N. Davis, Theories of Water
Pollution Litigation, 1971 WIS. L. REV. 738, 756-58.
14. See Davis, supra note 13, at 777-79.
15. See COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY: 15TH
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 374 (1984).
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against others in getting exclusive ownership of what is as abundant
as pure air in the United States of America. He asks protection in
getting legal control of strategic land sites that are blessed with
pure air. He has evidently, in times past, used physical force to
push weaker people into the cold air of the arctic or the hot air of
the tropics. When he learned to manufacture warm air in winter
and cool air in the summer, he claimed and acquired private property in the patents, the instruments, tools, materials, and building
which were scarce and needed in the process.
Pure air is the most valuable of all natural resources, but it has no
scarcity value. Its value is its “use value.” It is useful but abundant.
Scarcity value adheres to property rights in what is scarce and ex16
pected to be scarce.

Unlike Mill, Commons begins by explaining how rights to air
quality actually emerge, indicating that transacting parties would first
look to the sovereign to protect exclusive rights to clean air sites that
then evolve in the market process. This evolution occurs when the
scarcity value of environmental rights becomes large enough to offset
transaction costs. At this point, distinct environmental rights would
be traded separately from the land related to them. In this way, tradable site rights are early substitutes for tradable air rights. As Davis
suggests, upstream dischargers could simply purchase potentially affected riparian sites and internalize the effects of their pollution.17
However, Commons’ analysis is not entirely complete. For example, Commons recognizes that there is something peculiar about
the relationship between air quantity and quality, but he is unable to
18
identify it. When the different concepts of quantity and quality are
not recognized, a puzzle emerges: air seems to be simultaneously
abundant and scarce. The confusion is eliminated when air quality is
considered to be a separate stick in the property rights bundle that
describes the characteristics of a particular site. However, if ambient
air quality is to be maintained at a particular site, given current technology for enclosing particular land parcels, then the same air quality
must obtain for other sites in the region of the one protected. So, air

16. JOHN R. COMMONS, THE ECONOMICS OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 89 (Kenneth H. Parsons ed., Univ. of Wis. Press 1970) (1950).
17. See Davis, supra note 13, at 756-58, 777-80 (describing both contracting around the
common law rule and purchases of land).
18. If pure air were truly abundant, as Commons initially implies, why would individuals
seek to gain control of land solely on the basis of securing access to pure air? Commons seems
to contradict himself on this point. See COMMONS, supra note 16.
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quality is non-excludable;19 it is a collective or public good. Therefore, effective maintenance of air quality requires a collective effort.
An interesting example of how a collective outcome for an environmental right can emerge for multiple locations is seen in the
20
treatment of rights to sunlight in Japan. The example shows how 3D property rights can emerge for heavenly assets—in this case, sunlight. Due to population pressures, Japan underwent a construction
boom in the 1960s, and tall buildings constructed close to residential
homes obstructed light that previously came to those homes.21 This
high-rise construction caused an upsurge in disputes concerning ac22
cess to sunlight falling upon property owners’ premises. These disputes were widespread, because access to sunlight was being curtailed
in a country that already viewed solar access as quite valuable.23
Since the Japanese national government was slow to tackle the
issue of sunlight obstruction, local governments, which dealt with sunshine disputes on a daily basis, adopted sunshine guidelines to protect
24
residents’ access to light. These sunshine guidelines assigned light
rights (or protection from shadows) to the owners of individual par25
cels of land. The sunshine guidelines were not ordinances enacted
by local assemblies and therefore were not legally binding in themselves.26 However, local governments did “enforce” their own guidelines, when necessary, by taking actions such as delaying approval of
proposed construction plans and threatening to deny developers connection to the water supply or sewage system.27 Thus, although only
the Civil Code and other national laws define property rights under
the Japanese legal system, sunshine rights provided by local guidelines were property rights.28
These light rights were defined, because they specified minimum
amounts of sunlight that a builder had to secure for neighboring
19. See TIETENBERG, NATURAL RESOURCE ECONOMICS, supra note 6, at 51-52 (describing how public goods are non-excludable, which means that no one can be prevented from using
them).
20. See Shohei Koike, Public Choice of Property Rights to Sunlight: A Study of Japanese
Sunshine Rights (1984) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Univ. of Or.) (on file with Univ. Microfilms Int’l, Ann Arbor, Mich.).
21. See id. at 49.
22. See id. at 48.
23. See id. at 54-55.
24. See id. at 68.
25. See id. at 74.
26. See id. at 72
27. See id. at 72-73.
28. See id. at 74.
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homes, measurable using several methods adopted by local municipalities.29 Furthermore, sunshine rights gave exclusive rights to the
30
use and enjoyment of sunshine and were defensible. These rights
31
could also be traded and were, thus, divestible. Therefore, local
Japanese sunshine rights were 3-D property rights.32
These 3-D light rights forced builders to initiate negotiations
with residents if the developers wished to secure airspace in order to
33
construct a building. A person seeking to construct a building that
would block residents’ sunlight and, thus, violate the residents’ light
rights had to obtain unanimous consent from all affected property
34
owners. In effect, the Japanese rightholders held de facto rights to
undisturbed sunlight.35
So, in the process of establishing guidelines for protecting solar
access, Japanese municipalities created 3-D property rights for sunlight. Likewise, in the process of contracting around English common
law nuisance rules, 3-D property rights were created for air and water. Therefore, it is possible for 3-D property rights to exist for heavenly assets or elements of the atmosphere; however, the extent to
which such rights actually exist today must be analyzed in greater detail.

29. See id. at 68-72.
30. See id. at 74.
31. See id.
32. See id. While Japanese sunshine guidelines and, thus, the property rights in sunlight
that they created were not recognized by formal Japanese law, residents had de facto 3-D property rights in sunlight. Economists often recognize such de facto property rights that, while not
recognized by formal law, are recognized in fact. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW 53 (5th ed. 1998). Posner uses broadcast frequencies as an example of such
de facto property rights. See id. at 51-53. While Congress expressly provided that licensees had
no property rights in the broadcast frequencies that they were assigned by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), there are property rights in these frequencies in economic terms.
See id. at 52. Broadcast licenses are defined and granted by the FCC. See id. at 51. Once obtained, rights to use a certain broadcast frequency are divestible or transferable as an incident to
the physical assets of a radio or television station (much like Commons’ idea about air quality
being traded as an incident to land). See id. at 52. Furthermore, interference with a licensee’s
use of his frequency will be enjoined; so, the right to use the broadcast frequency is exclusive
and defensible. See id. Thus, there can be de facto 3-D property rights in an economic sense
without formal legal status. See id. at 51, 53.
33. See Koike, supra note 20, at 74.
34. See id. at 68, 74.
35. See id. at 74; see also POSNER, supra note 32, at 51, 53.
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B. What Do We Really Have Here, Private Property or Regulatory
Property?
Like Mill, those today who call for market solutions to environmental problems seem to be looking for something more or less than
36
common law institutions. For example, promoters of the modern
market celebrate “permit markets”37 where regulatory property is
38
traded. However, these same promoters of permit markets seldom
exhibit excitement for common law private property rights or the
ability of individuals to quietly contract due to the presence of
39
evolved 3-D rights. These more highly evolved and decentralized
private law transactions are rarely recognized by today’s promoters of
market solutions to environmental problems.40 So, to what extent do
3-D property rights really exist for air quality or other environmental
resources today?
The implicit forecasts contained in the comments of Mill and
Commons have come true. Though embryonic, crude, and largely
government-managed, markets for some specific components of air
41
quality do exist today. But, in what assets do these markets actually

36. See BRUCE YANDLE, COMMON SENSE AND COMMON LAW, supra note 9, at 144-46,
160-62. That is, some special interest groups want centralized command-and-control and an end
to common law; they want something less than common law. Others seek a stronger common
law with special courts; they want something more than common law. See, e.g., MICHAEL S.
GREVE, THE DEMISE OF ENVIRONMENTALISM IN AMERICAN LAW 115 (1996):
By common law I do not mean the historical common law as it existed at the time of
Blackstone or at the end of the nineteenth century. Rather, I have in mind the basic
logic of a legal system whose principal purpose lies in protecting private orderings.
Such a system guarantees robust individual rights to exclude others (property); provides avenues for voluntary exchanges (contracts); and protects against aggression by
outsiders (torts). Its fundamental maxim is “keep off.”
37. See, e.g., Robert W. Hahn, Economic Prescriptions for Environmental Problems: How
the Patient Followed the Doctor’s Orders, 3 J. ECON. PERSP. 95, 95-97 (1989) (arguing that “both
normative and positive theorizing could greatly benefit from a careful examination of the results
of recent innovative approaches to environmental management”—marketable permits and
emission charges); Robert W. Hahn & Roger G. Noll, Environmental Markets in the Year 2000,
3 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 351, 352-56, 365-66 (1990) (hailing marketable emission permits as
the key to avoiding the ills of command-and-control regulation and maintaining optimism about
marketable permits, despite the fact that “emissions-permits markets that resemble the economist’s textbook definition will be the exception rather than the rule”).
38. Jonathan Baert Wiener has properly referred to the assets traded in modern permit
markets as “regulatory property.” Jonathan Baert Wiener, Global Environmental Regulation:
Instrument Choice in Legal Context, 108 YALE L.J. 677, 800 (1999) [hereinafter Wiener, Instrument Choice in Legal Context].
39. See e.g., Hahn & Noll, supra note 37.
40. See Meiners & Yandle, supra note 13, at 956-57.
41. See TIETENBERG, NATURAL RESOURCE ECONOMICS, supra note 6, at 364-75;
TIETENBERG, ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS, supra note 6, at 254-60.
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trade? Electricity generators routinely purchase allowances42 that enable them to emit one ton of sulfur dioxide annually. Expanding industrial facilities also routinely purchase offsetting pollution reductions from firms in the same region.43 Dischargers of nitrogen and
phosphorous in some locations pay for the right to emit these nutri44
ents. Further, as Commons’ analysis suggests, real estate markets
routinely assign differential values to land as determined by local environmental quality.
But while this might sound good for property rights enthusiasts,
most of these crude markets are themselves components of a command-and-control regime that emerged in the United States in the
45
1970s for managing scarce and valuable environmental assets. This
new regulatory property did not evolve spontaneously through the
free interaction of individual agents. In fact, in some cases, the rights
may have little or nothing to do with human and environmental wellbeing.46 That is, the rights may simply represent contrived scarcity.

42. However, these allowances are carefully defined by statute as not being property rights.
See James L. Johnston, A Market Without Rights: Sulfur Dioxide Emissions Trading, REG., Fall
1991, at 24, 25 (discussing the non-property status of allowances traded under Title IV of the
1990 Clean Air Act amendments); James L. Johnston, Pollution Trading in La La Land, REG.,
Summer 1994, at 44, 48 (describing how Los Angeles’ RECLAIM program explicitly denies
property-right status to the credits traded under that program by stating that RECLAIM trading credits do “not constitute a security or other form of property”); 42 U.S.C. § 765b(f) (1996);
Cole, supra note 2, at 113 (quoting § 403(f) of the 1990 Clean Air Act amendments); South
Coast Air Quality Management District, Rule 2007. Trading Requirements (last modified July 7,
1999) <http://www.aqmd.gov/rules/html/r2007.html> (containing the language of Rule
2007(b)(3) under Regulation XX defining the RECLAIM program). Since 1994 some 100 million one-ton allowances have been traded, with the most recent trades fetching between $150
and $200 per allowance. See U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, Emissions Trading and Market
Trends (last modified Jan. 13, 2000) <http://www.epa.gov/acidrain/ats/trends.html>.
43. See Robert W. Hahn & Gordon L. Hester, Marketable Permits: Lessons from Theory
and Practice, 16 ECOLOGY L.Q. 361, 368-69, 371-72 (1989).
44. See Bruce Yandle, Community Markets to Control Agricultural Nonpoint Source Pollution, in TAKING THE ENVIRONMENT SERIOUSLY 185, 197 (Roger E. Meiners & Bruce Yandle
eds., 1993) [hereinafter Yandle, Community Markets].
45. See, e.g., TIETENBERG, NATURAL RESOURCE ECONOMICS, supra note 6, at 354-58;
YANDLE, COMMON SENSE AND COMMON LAW, supra note 9, at 143-45; BRUCE YANDLE, THE
POLITICAL LIMITS OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: TRACKING THE UNICORN 2-4 (1989)
[hereinafter YANDLE, TRACKING THE UNICORN]; Bruce Yandle, Escaping Environmental Feudalism, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 517, 536-37 (1992).
46. Federal air and water pollution statutes apply a uniform technology-based commandand-control regulation as the instrument for controlling emissions. It is well recognized that
control of inputs does not necessarily translate into control of outcomes. One can easily see that
an expansion of approved polluters along a particular river, with each satisfying command-andcontrol regulation, can yield more total pollution. For a discussion of this reasoning, see generally ROBERT W. CRANDALL, CONTROLLING INDUSTRIAL POLLUTION (1983); PAUL B.
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Furthermore, although real estate markets routinely assist in the allocation of differing environmental conditions, a mammoth and growing system of land-use control stands ready nationwide to deal with
such ill-specified problems and noble objectives as urban sprawl,
sustainability, and pollution prevention.47 All this leads to one conclusion: most of the markets that exist today do not trade in 3-D private property, rather they trade in regulatory property.
In fact, given that so many of the property markets today actually
trade in regulatory property, it is difficult to determine with any degree of accuracy the extent to which private property rights approaches to environmental problems are expanding or, indeed, contracting. So, given this experience, only the most optimistic supporter
of markets, property rights, and the common law would argue that 3D property rights would somehow evolve for all environmental resources. A more sober judge, looking at specific situations, will recognize competing property rights institutions and perhaps see the
merit in John R. Commons’ assessment regarding the competition—
at the end of the day, only sovereignty transfers ownership; so, the
48
sovereign will have its way. In this way, when called upon to settle
ownership controversies involving environmental use, the sovereign
49
will take command of the problem.
Indeed, in the two examples of 3-D property rights for heavenly
50
assets discussed above, air and sunlight, the sovereign did take
command of the problem. In the United States, the highly evolved

DOWNING, ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS AND POLICY (1984); TIETENBERG, NATURAL
RESOURCE ECONOMICS, supra note 6.
47. See Robert H. Nelson, Federal Zoning: The New Era in Environmental Policy, in LAND
RIGHTS: THE 1990S’ PROPERTY RIGHTS REBELLION 295, 296-99 (Burce Yandle ed., 1995).
48. See COMMONS, supra note 16, at 84:
The many technicalities of law required to define ownership may be summarized, for
economic purposes, as transfers of legal control by sovereignty, distinguished from
transfers of physical control by labor. The early English economists, habituated to the
Revolution of 1689, took for granted that the transfers of ownership were made by individuals, like the exchange of commodities, and, therefore, that sovereignty could be
eliminated from economic theory. But recent revolutions do not permit us to take the
economic behavior of sovereignty for granted, and both the law books and observations reveal that only sovereignty transfers ownership.
49. See id. Robert Nelson argues that this transformation of private property to public
property rights is in fact the way modern property rights evolve. The benefits that flow from
regulation are seen as being no different than the stream of benefits that comes from any other
form of property. See Robert H. Nelson, Private Rights to Government Actions: How Modern
Property Rights Evolve, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 361, 364; ROBERT H. NELSON, PUBLIC LANDS
AND PRIVATE RIGHTS: THE FAILURE OF SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT 335-37 (1995) [hereinafter
NELSON, PUBLIC LANDS & PRIVATE RIGHTS].
50. See discussion supra Part II.A.

YANDLE_FINAL_PAGEPROOF2

1999]

3-D PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE GLOBAL COMMONS

09/13/00 9:05 AM

25

but largely invisible common law markets for air and water were
sharply constrained or eliminated by federal statutory law in the late
51
1960s and early 1970s. Federal statutory law transformed private
property rights into regulatory property rights.52
Likewise, Japanese sunshine rights met the same fate as U.S.
common law property rights—the national government intervened
and turned private property rights into regulatory property rights.
Since Japanese sunshine rights required developers to gain unanimous support of affected residents, the process of obtaining light
rights from landowners was costly and slow, requiring developers to
53
bear high transaction costs. With each affected landowner holding
veto power, landowners raced to be last in the negotiating process in
order to increase their bargaining power with developers.54 This phenomenon is known as the holdout problem.
Chaffing at the prospects of dealing with holdouts who theoretically could obtain all the rents associated with a planned high-rise
building, Japanese developers turned to the national government and
obtained statutes and regulations, abrogating local sunshine guide55
lines. The national government adopted a statute whereby the government regulates the “emission” of shadows extending beyond a
building site rather than requires a builder to secure a certain amount
of sunshine for adjacent homes.56 In this way, the Japanese government decided to regulate building construction through a shadow
“emission” standard rather than to assign property rights to sunlight
51. The alteration of environmental property rights brought about by the 1972 Federal Water Pollution Control Act illustrates the point. See Todd J. Zywicki, Environmental Externalities
and Political Externalities: The Political Economy of Environmental Regulation and Reform, 73
TUL. L. REV. 845, 907 (1999) (“[T]he government could still prosecute a paper mill for violating
the Clean Water Act, even if all those actually affected by the use voluntarily bargained to allow
the use. The violation of the statute is itself a harm punishable by the government . . . .”).
52. Wiener sees these evolving rights as part of a “meta-market response to the incompleteness of status quo markets.” Wiener, Instrument Choice in Legal Context, supra note 38, at
800. While this is a logical public interest or efficiency explanation for regulatory property,
there is also a special interest explanation. See discussion infra Part II.C.
53. See Koike, supra note 20, at 72.
54. See id. (“Builders and developers claimed that some residents stubbornly refused to
negotiate or that they demanded huge compensation even when a proposed building would
shade an attic or a small portion of a garden or fence. Prolonged negotiations delayed commencement of construction and often led to the cancellation of construction plans.”).
55. See id. at 85-86. The degree to which a holdout could obtain such monopoly power relates to the skill of the bargaining parties and the availability of competing locations for a highrise building. The problem is similar to that confronted in obtaining the right-of-way for a
highway. See Bruce Yandle, Externalities and Highway Location, 24 TRAFFIC Q. 583, 586-90
(1970).
56. See Koike, supra note 20, at 81.
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for homeowners.57 Private property rights to sunlight were converted
to regulatory property rights.58 Special interests, the developers, were
able to effect this change, overriding private law markets and institutions, by using political power to provoke the national sovereign to
act.
C. The Rule of Politics and the Rule of Law
Why, at some point, does the rule of politics tend to enter and
override the rule of private law and markets in the development of
new environmental property rights? A partial answer to the question
59
requires a public choice interpretation of political decision-making.
The process of defining property rights defines wealth and its distribution in society. Thus, any process that redefines property rights redistributes wealth. The slow and continuous common law process
may disrupt property rights at the margin (for the controversy before
the court) but cannot disrupt a property rights system entirely.60 In
contrast, the statutory law process can redefine the status of all existing rightholders while simultaneously setting new rules for all future
transactions.
In the case of Japanese sunlight, resort to regulation and the law
of politics implied that rights were transferred from a large number of
61
highly diverse individual landowners to politicians, who were responding to a much smaller number of better-organized developers
and related interest groups. These special interest groups had to persuade the politicians to decide in their favor. Although persuading
the politicians may not have been very difficult, the parties involved
were operating behind a veil of uncertainty. Developers knew that
they were developers; however, they did not know where and when

57. See id. at 82-83.
58. See id. at 83:
Unlike the municipal government’s sunshine guidelines, the [national statute] neither
requires the builder to obtain consent from residents nor allows the parties to engage
in voluntary trade. The national government insisted that the 1976 revision did not incorporate the notion of [sunshine rights], but instead set a shadow ‘emission’ standard
thereby regulating building construction.
59. See YANDLE, COMMON SENSE AND COMMON LAW, supra note 9, at 63-85.
60. See Meiners & Yandle, supra note 13, at 946-48; POSNER, supra note 32, at 570 (“Ordinarily, the only way a common law court can redistribute wealth is by means of (in effect) an
excise tax on the activity involved in the suit. It is not easy to redistribute wealth by this
means.”).
61. Of course, a formal transfer of rights does not take place when politicians decide to
regulate. But an informal or implied transfer takes place any time that politicians revise a
statement that redefines wealth.
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they might be developing land in the future. In a similar way, residential holders of sunlight rights did not know when they might wish
to sell their land for development purposes. Establishing codes or
regulations may have reduced transaction costs for all parties,62 including owners of individual sites who wished to develop their land,
but these regulations have costs of their own. Generally, there are
differential effects in such actions. In fact, it is highly likely that some
individual site owners lost wealth, because landowners no longer held
the power to veto the construction of tall buildings.
From the politician/broker’s standpoint, the opportunity to extract political payments is large when newly formed or revised prop63
erty rights are redefining wealth. However, in order to extract these
rewards, the gains must be appropriable by a pre-identified special interest group. That is, the politician/broker, as well as the potential recipient of wealth redistribution, must know who will receive the politically formed wealth.
With constitutional dominance over
customary and common law, authors of statutes can suppress the informal property rights process and replace it with statutory law and
political control. In instances where it is costly to construct political
markets, where the expected gains are not appropriable and the beneficiaries not well recognized, or where political gains are exhausted,
the sovereign, by benign neglect, may actually encourage 3-D property rights and unfettered markets.
What about the global commons? As humans encourage rules
for managing the global commons, is there any reason to think that
property rights institutions for the global commons will vary from the
command-and-control/regulatory property model that predominates
today? The answer is yes. Because of the high cost of constructing
political markets and the absence of tangible political gains, politicians and the interest groups they serve may be so constrained that 3D rights will emerge in the global commons. Because there is no

62. For a discussion of why parties may desire regulation and the lessons that Public
Choice offers, see Bruce Yandle, Public Choice at the Intersection of Environmental Law and
Economics, 8 EUR. J.L. & ECON. 5 (1999); YANDLE, COMMON SENSE AND COMMON LAW, supra note 9, at 63-82.
63. The reference here, of course, is to rent-seeking and rent-extracting behavior. For
more on rent seeking, see Anne O. Krueger, The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society,
in TOWARD A THEORY OF THE RENT-SEEKING SOCIETY 51, 51-70 (James M. Buchanan et al.
eds., 1980); FRED S. MCCHESNEY, MONEY FOR NOTHING: POLITICIANS, RENT EXTRACTION,
AND POLITICAL EXTORTION 20-42 (1997). See generally Zywicki, supra note 51; GORDON
TULLOCK, RENT SEEKING (Locke Inst., Shaftesbury Papers 2, Charles K. Rowley ed., 1993).
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world constitutional order, the cost of constructing political markets
at the international level is extraordinarily high.64
III. THE EVOLUTION OF 3-D PROPERTY RIGHTS
It has been shown that 3-D property rights can emerge for heav65
enly assets, such as air quality. Furthermore, because of the high
transaction costs associated with constructing international political
markets, it is possible that 3-D property rights will emerge for the
global commons. It remains, however, to explain how this institution
will emerge. To describe this process, a simple, stylized model of
property rights development is explained. Then, current examples of
property rights at the global level are examined. Finally, the pieces
are brought together to begin to paint a picture of how property
rights will emerge in the global commons.
A. A Simple Model of Property Rights Evolution
1. Laying Some Background
When analyzing property rights evolution, it is helpful to think
about the process in a highly stylized fashion. Doing so suggests there
are distinct stations that characterize the transition from common access to fee simple property rights when the property rights evolution
process occurs for one community of people living under one constitution. These stations of development are the following:
1. The Commons,
2. Common Property,
3. Public Property, and either
4. Regulatory Property or
5. Private Property.
Starting with the commons, the story of how property rights
evolve for particular resources begins when the commons becomes
66
crowded and resources become scarce. For rights evolution to un64. See Douglass C. North, Dealing with a Non-Ergodic World: Institutional Economics,
Property Rights, and the Global Environment, 10 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 1, 5 (1999).
65. See discussion supra Part I.A.
66. See YANDLE, COMMON SENSE AND COMMON LAW, supra note 9, at 2-3; NELSON,
PUBLIC LANDS & PRIVATE RIGHTS, supra note 49, at 346. For key contributions to property
rights theory, see JOHN R. UMBECK, A THEORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS (1981); Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, The Property Rights Paradigm, 33 J. ECON. HIST. 16 (1973); Terry L.
Anderson & P.J. Hill, The Evolution of Property Rights: A Study of the American West, 18 J.L.
& ECON. 163 (1975); Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules,
and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972); Steven N.S.
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fold at this point of meaningful scarcity, interested parties first must
be able to identify, measure, and monitor in acceptable ways the resource or resource characteristic that matters to them. Then, the
benefits of doing so must be worth the cost of making the identification. Taking this step yields the first “D” in 3-D property rights. That
is, rights to the resource or resource characteristic—the thing that
matters to people—are technically definable. For example, if the
thickness of the ozone layer matters to some meaningful number of
people who embrace a single constitutional government and if its dimensions can be measured, monitored, and recorded, then it is technically possible for those people to define property rights in the ozone
layer.
The next step in the evolutionary process, common property, arrives when leadership emerges from various struggling groups and
encloses parts of the commons, by rule or by fence, for a particular
group’s exclusive, but undivided, use. In that way, a system of feudal
property emerges. If the enclosure can be monitored and made economically secure, the second “D” in 3-D property rights emerges.
That is, the newly defined common property rights are defendable;
undesirable visitors can be excluded. This assumes, of course, that
the rights in question are worth defending. Again, using the ozone
layer as an example, an organized community of people might agree
to constrain actions that weaken or damage the collective ozone
layer.67 If cooperation is somehow induced, then common property
rights and duties will have emerged.
At this point in the process, an institutional choice is implied, and
different rights may emerge. There is a pending choice among property regimes. Economies of scale in defining and defending exclusive
rights to a resource can lead to either the invention of a new government function or government takeover of the property rights func68
tion. Therefore, at this stage in the evolutionary process, the ComCheung, The Fable of the Bees: An Economic Investigation, 16 J.L. & ECON. 11 (1973); Demsetz, supra note 2; James E. Krier, The Pollution Problem and Legal Institutions: A Conceptual
Overview, 18 UCLA L. REV. 429 (1971).
67. The development of new property institutions that relate to aspects of the global commons may be seen in efforts to regulate chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs). See generally FOREST
REINHARDT, DU PONT FREON PRODUCTS DIVISION (A) (Harvard Business School Case No. 9389-111, 1989). The challenge here is how to protect a stock of stratospheric ozone that offers
protection from exposure to ultraviolet rays that cause skin cancer and damage to crops and
fisheries.
68. See generally John Umbeck, Might Makes Right: A Theory of the Foundation and Initial
Distribution of Property Rights, 19 ECON. INQUIRY 38 (1981) (employing the theory of competition to explain the formation and distribution of property rights).
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mon Property rights that have emerged can become: (1) Public Property, with government agents managing the resource in question; (2)
Regulatory Property, with government agents allocating and managing inalienable rights; or (3) Private Property, with private parties allocating, managing, and transferring rights in the benign light of government. If private rights emerge and become alienable by strictly
private agreement, then the last of the 3-D characteristics has
evolved. The rights are divestible or transferable.
2. What Explains the Choice at the Property Rights Fork?
Saying that institutional choices are implied when either public
or private property rights might emerge is not to say that the choices
are made in some explicit and institutionally defined manner. Instead
of trying to picture a New England town meeting that arrives at a
consensus regarding an institutional structure, it is better to visualize
a social/political tug-of-war where under certain circumstances property rights emerge in one way or another. With a host of political/economic/legal variables specified, only the bravest social scientists would attempt to forecast the details and specific timing of
property rights outcomes. Unfortunately, the model for making such
forecasts is not well specified. Therefore, it may be useful to speculate.
Private 3-D rights can emerge in either of two ways. First, 3-D
rights can evolve directly from the commons and common property
without meaningful collective action.69 The public choice analysis applied to Japanese sunlight rights suggests that quiet evolution of rights
will occur where there are no well-identified and organized special interest groups who might seek to resolve their property rights concern
by political means.70 Put differently, when rights are defined collectively, there are no easily identifiable interest groups that assign a
high likelihood of receiving appropriable wealth. Neither the politician nor the rights recipients have much at stake in the process. In
this case, the public sector does not play a role in getting the rights
process started.
Alternately, private rights may evolve from regulatory property
in a two-step process: (1) special interest benefits are sufficient to
generate regulatory property; and (2) these special interest benefits
69. See generally BRUCE L. BENSON, THE ENTERPRISE OF LAW: JUSTICE WITHOUT THE
STATE (1994); ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE
DISPUTES (1991).
70. See Koike, supra note 20; discussion supra Part II.C.
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become obsolete in the eyes of the interest groups that supported
their political creation, or competing interest groups emerge who seek
3-D rights. In this two-step process, government first sets initial
boundary conditions, specifies rules that define a domain for trade or
allocation, allocates allowances, and manages elements of the trading
process. Then, because the regulated property ceases to be valuable
or competing interest groups express an overriding demand for 3-D
rights, or because government cannot stop the evolutionary process,
the regulatory property rights become 3-D private property rights.71
3. Historical Notes on Property Rights Evolution
Demsetz72, Libecap73, Ostrom,74 Anderson and Leal,75 Anderson
76
and Hill, and others provide stories of property rights evolution that
help one to focus on the economic and social forces that lead this
evolutionary process. Put in the simplest possible terms, the steps
that lead from one property rights station to the next will be taken
77
when the benefits of doing so are greater than the costs. As Anderson and Leal point out, capturing horses from the wild and training
them to carry cowboys along property lines may be economic in a
78
world without barbed wire. But the invention of barbed wire can
lead to the release of horses to the wild. In a story of benefits and
costs, the common-access resource—horses in the wild—is converted
71. There is obviously friction in the process just described. For example, grazing rights
defined by the federal government allow owners of adjacent private land to graze animals on
federal land. See Terry L. Anderson & Donald R. Leal, Rekindling the Privatization Fires: Political Lands Revisited, in BREAKING THE ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY GRIDLOCK, supra note 4,
at 53, 76-77. The rights are not officially private property but they can be transferred when the
related land is bought and sold. See id. Environmental groups now seek to purchase and retire
grazing rights in the hope of reducing damage by cattle to riparian land. Ranchers who seek to
maintain the status of their regulatory property rights oppose the interests of the environmentalists. See id. at 77-78; William J. Carney, From Stakeholders to Stockholders: A View from the
Organizational Theory, in WHO OWNS THE ENVIRONMENT?, supra note 1, at 187, 187-88. The
general problem here is referred to as the transitional gains trap. See Gordon Tullock, The
Transitional Gains Trap, 6 BELL J. ECON. 671 (1975); TULLOCK, supra note 63, at 66-69.
72. See Demsetz, supra note 2.
73. See GARY D. LIBECAP, CONTRACTING FOR PROPERTY RIGHTS (1989).
74. See ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF
INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990).
75. See ANDERSON & LEAL, supra note 1.
76. See Terry L. Anderson & P.J. Hill, From Free Grass to Fences Transforming the Commons of the American West, in MANAGING THE COMMONS 119 (John A. Baden & Douglas S.
Noonan eds., 2d ed. 1998).
77. See Demsetz, supra note 2, at 350 (“[P]roperty rights develop to internalize externalities when the gains of internalization become larger than the cost of internalization.”)
78. See ANDERSON & LEAL, supra note 1, at 31.
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to private property when it is economic to do so and then released to
become a common-access resource again when it no longer pays to
79
keep horses. In their current state, the progeny of these released
horses are common property in some settings, meaning that members
of a defined community have rights of capture that may be exercised
with group permission, and public property managed by the United
States government in other settings.
By way of contrast, consider environmental resources that have
traveled part, but not all, of the way through the property rights stations. An example is water quality in nineteenth century Prussia. In
the nineteenth century, heavy pollution in the Ruhr, Emscher, and
80
Wupper rivers had serious human health consequences. This led the
Prussian government to define, allocate, and defend public property
81
rights in water quality by creating water management organizations.
Today, the water management organizations act with owner-like concern as they build treatment plants, determine and collect fees, and
82
manage parks and recreational areas. To the extent possible, public
sector managers charge prices and manage environmental assets as
though they were private property.83 Therefore, there is a system of
2-D, feudal property rights that provides incentives for cost-effective
pollution control. But the next step—the formation of fully alienable
private rights to consume specified units of water quality—has not
84
taken place, nor is it likely to occur. The prospect is not bright for
further efficiency gains that could come when dischargers and environmentalists buy and sell rights in open markets. Indeed, the author
was told on his last visit to the Ruhr headquarters in Essen, Germany
that there would never be another river basin association like the 2-D
systems in all of Germany.85 As the author’s host saw it, the politics of
control would not allow it. Why? How does the theory of property
rights evolution explain this?

79. See id. at 32; Anderson & Hill, supra note 76, at 129.
80. See David W. Riggs & Bruce Yandle, Environmental Quality, Biological Envelopes,
and River Basin Markets for Water Quality, in WATER MARKETING—THE NEXT GENERATION
147, 152-53 (Terry L. Anderson & Peter J. Hill eds., 1997).
81. See BLAIR T. BOWER ET AL., INCENTIVES IN WATER QUALITY MANAGEMENT:
FRANCE AND THE RUHR AREA 228-30 (Resources for the Future Res. Paper R-24, 1981).
82. See Interview with Detlef R. Albrecht, Ruhrverband Director of Public Affairs, in Essen, Germany (Apr. 6, 1998).
83. See id.
84. See id.
85. See id.
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Apparently, the water quality management system within the
Ruhr, Wupper, and Emscher basins continues to produce or protect
enough appropriable wealth for well-defined interest groups to maintain those systems. Those who might oppose the current 2-D systems
cannot dislodge them. However, consider a hypothetical decision
point where government may redefine the property rights regime.
Even though the current 2-D systems cannot be dislodged, the competing system of public property and command-and-control regulation introduced later in other German river basins generates more
appropriable wealth for important interest groups than would the
Ruhr approach. Therefore, those who might seek to install a Ruhrlike system of 2-D rights on other rivers cannot overcome the resistance of those who seek command-and-control regulation. So, what
are the interest groups that gain from command-and-control but lose
from a system that relies on economic incentives?
Three important groups come to mind: environmental groups,
major industrial firms, and government bureaucrats. First, the German Green party and well-organized environmental groups oppose
the notion of private property rights for environmental management.
Allocating environmental assets by bidding is anathema to these
groups. They prefer the more costly command-and-control approach,
86
which is to say they prefer public property rights. Second, major industrial firms often prefer technology-based regulation and dealing
with politicians and bureaucrats to prices, property rights, and markets. Prices and fees, which can fall and rise, are direct additions to
operating costs for firms. Command-and-control regulation, however, can be used to raise competitors’ costs.87 Finally, government
86. For a discussion of German environmental groups and German automobile manufacturers as a Baptist-bootlegger coalition, see DAVID VOGEL, TRADING UP: CONSUMER AND
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 63-67 (1995). For an interesting historical comparison with conservation groups involved in the negotiations over cleaning up the
Ohio River Basin in the 1930s, see EDWARD J. CLEARY, THE ORSANCO STORY 31 (1967)
(“Conservation groups . . . espoused federal control as the only solution to the problem.” (emphasis added)).
87. See Michael T. Maloney & Robert E. McCormick, A Positive Theory of Environmental
Quality Regulation, 25 J.L. & ECON. 99, 105-06, 121-22 (1982) (describing how environmental
quality regulation can raise rivals’ costs and “redistribute wealth among competing firms in [an]
industry”); Jonathan Baert Wiener, On the Political Economy of Global Environmental Regulation, 87 GEO. L.J. 749, 763-64 (1999) (noting that industries supported the increased environmental standards in the Clean Water Act because they were seeking “to supplant patchwork
state regulation . . . with uniform federal regulation”); VOGEL, supra note 86, at 259-61 (describing how domestic firms may rely on environmental regulation to burden international rivals
and stating that these “regulations may amount to little more than disguised forms of protec-
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bureaucrats prefer technology-based standards to 3-D rights or even
2-D rights, because the management of technology-based standards
88
does not require any monitoring of environmental use. Generally
speaking, the bureaucracy loses power as dimensions are added to
property rights.
A somewhat similar story can be told about the Ohio River and
ORSANCO, the river association that resulted from a 1948 multistate compact for the purpose of restoring water quality to safe lev89
els. In fact, the Ohio and Ruhr share similar histories. Both were
major industrial rivers.90 Both were located in coal and steel territories, and both experienced serious degradation from the discharge of
human waste.91
By the 1930s, the Ohio River received wastes from 19 million
92
people and some of the largest industrial plants in the world. Cincinnati, Ohio, located at the lower end of the Ohio River, bore the
brunt not only of its own untreated municipal sewage but the pollution received from upstream.93 Even as cities along the Ohio began
installing filtration plants, increased pollution caused a multitude of
hardships for the river’s water quality, such as concentration of sewage-associated bacteria, poor tastes and odors due to decomposition
of organic matter, and conditions of excessive hardness and acidity in
the water contributing to scale formation in steam boilers and corrosion of pipes respectively.94 Sporadic outbreaks of gastrointestinal
disorders were also prevalent.95
The stimulus that solved the prisoners’ dilemma for the Ohio
River and provided the impetus to change the river’s status as an

tionism”); see generally E. Donald Elliott et al., Toward a Theory of Statutory Evolution: The
Federalization of Environmental Law, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 313 (1985).
88. For a discussion of why command-and-control regulation appeals to bureaucrats, see
Yandle, Community Markets, supra note 44, at 194-95.
89. See CLEARY, supra note 86, at 6-7; M.T. Maloney & Bruce Yandle, Building Markets
for Tradable Pollution Rights, in WATER RIGHTS: SCARCE RESOURCE ALLOCATION,
BUREAUCRACY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 283, 294-95 (Terry L. Anderson ed., 1983).
90. See CLEARY, supra note 86, at 127; BOWER ET AL., supra note 81, at 217.
91. See CLEARY, supra note 86, at 11, 19; BOWER ET AL., supra note 81, at 216-17.
92. See Maloney & Yandle, supra note 89, at 295.
93. See id. The pollution costs imposed on Cincinnati by upstream cities were aptly described by the remarks of the Chairman of the Cincinnati Chamber of Commerce in 1934:
“[C]itizens of Cincinnati don’t want to be reminded everytime [sic] asparagus is served for supper in Pittsburgh or some other upstream community.” CLEARY, supra note 86, at 28.
94. See CLEARY, supra note 86, at 25.
95. See id.
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open-access commons occurred in 1935.96 In 1935, the effects of pollution on Pittsburgh and other upstream cities, that had routinely discharged untreated human waste into the river, were particularly serious.97 The presence of acids in the uppermost stretches of the Ohio
River caused major corrosion damage and retarded decomposition of
upstream sewage, causing a high concentration of bacterial pollution.98 In an interesting way, Cincinnati got revenge. However, even
at Cincinnati, halfway down the river where natural purification
should have improved the situation, the water quality had deteriorated to the point where every known technique of water purification
could not maintain an adequate margin of safety for Cincinnati resi99
dents.
So, in late 1935, the Cincinnati Chamber of Commerce took the
lead in beginning negotiations that eventually led to the establishment of the ORSANCO regional compact.100 With the compact in
place, the Ohio River ceased being a commons and became subject to
a system of public property rights, managed by a multi-state river basin association, ORSANCO. ORSANCO developed a system of continuous water quality monitoring, imposed cost-effective cleanup
standards on dischargers in the basin, and generally managed the
Ohio River with owner-like concern.101 Water quality and public
health improved.102
In 1972, however, the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
103
The public property
ended ORSANCO’s evolutionary process.
rights held and managed by the regional association were nationalized and made federal public property. The 1972 statute also stripped
away the 3-D common law rights of riparian landowners that had operated in interstate matters and weakened the fully developed common law rights that protected the environment within the 50 states.

96. See CLEARY, supra note 86, at 25; Maloney & Yandle, supra note 89, at 295.
97. See CLEARY, supra note 86, at 26.
98. See id.
99. See id.
100. See id. at 28-29. States continued negotiating the regional compact throughout the late
1930s. See id. at 42-45. In 1938, Congress submitted the final document creating the
ORSANCO compact to the states for ratification. See id. at 45. The process of negotiation was
not complete, however, until 1948 when the last state, Virginia, approved the compact. See id. at
47.
101. See CLEARY, supra note 86, at 104-05, 106-08, 124-26, 197-210.
102. See CLEARY, supra note 86, at 221.
103. See Maloney & Yandle, supra note 89, at 301.

YANDLE_FINAL_PAGEPROOF2

36

DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM

09/13/00 9:05 AM

[Vol. 10:13

For interesting reasons, then, some private property rights and
regional public property rights became national public property. Apparently, the amount of special interest wealth that could be generated at the level of the national government exceeded the wealth that
had been formed around ORSANCO’s activities. As has been dis104
cussed and documented elsewhere, national politicians saw an opportunity to satisfy industry demand for uniform rules and industry
desire to escape from common law, while simultaneously gaining the
support and praise of environmental organizations that had much to
gain by focusing attention at the level of the national government.105
A review of natural resource history can uncover elements of a
rich process that seems to yield differing property rights institutions.
Yes, certain rights to land, trees, and minerals that once were com106
mon-access resources can now be owned fee simple. The examples
provided and a vast set of other resources have 3-D property rights
within the complex property rights bundle associated with a resource.
At the same time, however, a growing set of restrictions on some
natural resource property rights and the outright destruction or conversion of others can be observed.107 So while some may feel comfortable with the notion that certain elements of the property rights
evolution process are understood, researchers are not well equipped
to predict accurately when and how 3-D private property rights to
particular environmental resources will cross and re-cross the property threshold. The current understanding of the process is incomplete. With these notions in mind, it is time to consider the global
commons.

104. See YANDLE, TRACKING THE UNICORN, supra note 45.
105. See id. at 73-75.
106. See, e.g., Michael Markels, Jr., Farming the Oceans: An Update, REG., Spring 1998, at 9,
9-10 & n.2 (1998) (identifying a recent noteworthy enclosure of the high seas). Ocean Fishing,
Inc., has negotiated a contract with the Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI) to certain specific rights to 800,000 square miles of ocean. See id. at 10. The firm will fertilize the sea and harvest the fish. See id.
107. See, e.g., LAND RIGHTS: THE 1990S’ PROPERTY RIGHTS REBELLION, supra note 47
(discussing various legal restrictions on property rights, from wetland regulation to endangered
species regulation to federal zoning).
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B. Recent Experience with Property Rights in the Global Commons:
The Montreal and Kyoto Protocols
1. Phase One: Defining Property Rights to Heavenly Assets
The development of new property institutions relating to aspects
of the global commons is best demonstrated by efforts to regulate
108
chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs). There, the challenge is how to protect
the stock of stratospheric ozone, which offers protection from cancercausing ultraviolet rays that can cause substantial damage to crops
109
and fisheries. At first glance, it appears that the lack of a constitutional framework and common social norms, just to mention two of
many commonly identified obstacles, causes the global challenge to
be far more daunting than efforts to solve national environmental
problems. Yet, perhaps it is the very absence of a traditional political
structure, thereby limiting the prospect of special interest rent seeking
and political payoffs that will increase the pace of private property
rights development.110
First, consider the ozone layer. Viewed simply, the ozone layer is
a naturally provided roof that shelters and shields a protected population from externally imposed harm. Some members of the protected
population engage in beneficial activities that weaken and damage
the roof. The problem is that there is no landlord, no roof owner.
The roof is a global commons. Thus, even when the cost of an illmaintained roof is recognized, finding agreement to avoid roofdamaging activities and enforcing that agreement is costly. Because
detection of those who violate the agreement is difficult, individuals
find that there are attractive short-run gains to be obtained by engaging in roof-damaging activities.
However, if 3-D property rights were to emerge for the ozone
layer, one could well imagine how a single owner might deal with
trespassers who trampled the ozone. But such institutional infrastructure is almost totally absent with respect to the stratospheric ozone
108. See generally REINHARDT, supra note 67.
109. See id. at 1.
110. The situation is similar to the legal environment faced by merchant adventurers in the
Middle Ages when doing business across vast multi-national territories. See LEON E. TRAKMAN,
THE LAW MERCHANT: THE EVOLUTION OF COMMERCIAL LAW 10-11 (1983). Lacking the
reach of formal law, the merchants developed their own private law—the Law Merchant—and
means for adjudicating controversies and punishing offenders. See id. at 7-22; BENSON, supra
note 69, at 30-35. Trade sanctions were the principle means of punishing itinerant merchants.
See BENSON, supra note 69, at 33 (“Merchant court decisions were backed by the threat of ostracism, a very effective boycott sanction.”). The same may hold true in the global commons.
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layer. Therefore, quite possibly an agreement on major boundary
conditions is the most that could be expected.
One example of how the global community has dealt with the destruction of the ozone layer is the Montreal Accord. The Montreal
Accord, and subsequent U.S. regulation, phased down and then
111
banned the production and sale of CFCs. In this way, regulation focused on activities “under the roof” and implicitly made the CFCsensitive part of the roof the common property of the United Nations.
Thus, command-and-control ruled the day. But what about the interests of the major producers of CFCs? Would they prefer the Montreal phase-down to a cap-and-trade system that gives CFC users the
option of purchasing easements or access rights?
As demonstrated by the CFC phase down, avoiding the tragedy
112
of the commons inevitably means imposing restrictions on output.
In 1988, when the EPA announced the CFC restriction, the agency
indicated that the phase-down would generate windfall profits of $1.8
billion to $7.2 billion by the end of the century for American producers of CFCs.113 That said, it is important to note that the EPA estimates assumed that legitimate producers of CFCs and CFC substi114
tutes would continue to hold the market. Of course, that turned out
not to be the case. In effect, the Montreal Protocol created an illegal
market for CFCs, and this illegal market continues to flourish today.
Still, the promise of phase-down profits must have comforted major
CFC producers and provided powerful incentives for the world’s
major CFC substitute producers to monitor government enforcement
of the CFC phase-out. Like the merchant adventurers of old, these
chemical companies sought to impose trade sanctions on marketers of
contraband. Thus, such 2-D regulatory property rights crudely, but
perhaps efficiently, addressed the problem. However, as monitoring
capabilities improve and the opportunity for enclosure is enhanced, it
is possible that other versions of 2-D regulatory rights will evolve.

111. See Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Annex A, 26
I.L.M. 1550 (1987), reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD
ORDER 840, 840-45 (Burns H. Weston et al. eds., 2d ed. 1990).
112. See James M. Buchanan & Gordon Tullock, Polluters’ ‘Profit’ and Political Response:
Direct Controls Versus Taxes, 65 AM. ECON. REV. 139, 142 (1975) (describing how the attractiveness of regulation-induced profits leads the regulated to prefer command-and-control regulation to property rights and markets).
113. See Zywicki, supra note 51, at 871.
114. See id.
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The 1997 Kyoto Agreement provides yet another example of the
115
global effort to manage a specific dimension of the global commons.
In this case, carbon was assumed to be the culprit, and instead of
eroding a heavenly roof, carbon emissions were determined to provide undesirable thickening of the roof that could effect the global
116
climate. The Kyoto Agreement and Montreal Protocol share many
characteristics. However, the absolute right to emit carbon is far
more vital to life in the developed world than the right to emit CFCs.
Unlike the emission of CFCs, there are no known low-cost substitutes
for carbon emissions. Nevertheless, although a total phase-out of
carbon dioxide emissions would be impossible, there could be reductions in the amount of such emissions. The Kyoto Agreement seeks
to achieve this aim by requiring developed nations to reduce carbon
emissions to 1990 levels.117 However, the undeveloped world is al118
lowed to continue to emit with impunity.
As with the Montreal Protocol then, Kyoto gives common property status to the atmosphere—the global carbon commons—with respect to developed nations, but the atmosphere remains a true global
commons for the rest of the world, allowing non-developed nations to
treat the atmosphere as an open-access carbon dump. Thus, the first
“D” in 3-D property rights is in place for some, but not for others.
The new property is managed by the United Nations, and selfimposed rationing becomes the political instrument for managing
these new property rights.
An important question arises: aside from achieving the unlikely
goal of reducing the probability of global climate change, what is the
119
incentive, the payoff, that emerges from this new property? As with

115. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,
Dec. 10, 1997, Conference of the Parties, 3d Sess., Agenda Item 5, U.N. Doc.
FCCC/CP/1997/L.7/Add.1, reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 22 (1998) (not yet in force) (84 signatories and
22 Parties as of Jan. 20, 2000), available at <http://www.unfccc.de/resource/docs/cop3/l07a01.
htm>. See Peter G. Sparber & Peter E. O’Rourke, Understanding the Kyoto Protocol,
BRIEFLY . . . : PERSP. ON LEGIS., REG., & LITIG. (Nat’l Legal Ctr. for the Pub. Interest, Washington, D.C.), Apr. 1998, at 7-8.
116. See Sparber & O’Rourke, supra note 115, at 2-7.
117. See id. at 7, 9.
118. See id. at 9-10.
119. The goal is unlikely to be achieved given the fact that the undeveloped world, producer
of approximately 40 percent of current carbon dioxide emissions, is unconstrained and expanding emission-related production. See BRUCE YANDLE, BOOTLEGGERS, BAPTISTS, AND
GLOBAL WARMING 2 (Pol. Econ. Res. Ctr., PERC Pol’y Series PS-14, 1998) [hereinafter
YANDLE, BOOTLEGGERS]; Bruce Yandle, After Kyoto: A Global Scramble for Advantage, 4
INDEP. REV. 19, 23 (1999) [hereinafter Yandle, After Kyoto].
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CFC restrictions and the Montreal Protocol, output restrictions generate increased profits and change relative prices. Therefore, due to
the Kyoto Protocol, cartelized cutbacks on carbon will raise the relative price of coal and reduce the relative price of natural gas and oil.120
Huge profits and losses hang in the balance.121 Coal is predicted to
suffer the largest loss in market share, while natural gas becomes the
fuel of choice.122 Cleaner burning petroleum could also gain market
share.123 Apparently, the oil and gas interests will outperform the coal
124
Although there is more to the story, there is clear eviinterests.
dence that the Kyoto output restriction will produce massive amounts
of appropriable special interest wealth.
Unlike the emission of CFCs, world production and emissions of
carbon dioxide will and must continue. This raises the prospect for
the emergence of 3-D property rights. Although permit trading is the
centerpiece of the Kyoto plan, with the necessary legal environment
yet to be defined and the extent of the market for trade yet to be determined, the Kyoto Protocol provides only boundary conditions and
125
It is very likely, though, that if a
prospects for a crude market.
regulatory property market does emerge, the associated rents will
eventually dissipate, and, eventually, 3-D property rights will emerge.
2. Phase Two: Measuring and Monitoring the New Property
The cost of measuring and monitoring the use of global common
property is crucial to 3-D property rights evolution. For example, if
certain dimensions of the ozone layer can be measured, but the cost
of monitoring use of the layer is prohibitive, no more than 1-D property rights can be expected. Thus, common and/or regulatory property and command-and-control will be the dominant institutions.
However, if monitoring costs fall, and the ozone layer is deemed
valuable enough, the emergence of 2-D rights can be predicted. Consequently, the ozone layer can be defended against undesirable use.
As monitoring costs fall further, holding constant the value of ozone
layer use, alienability can emerge, giving rise to 3-D rights.
Science fiction writers help one to imagine an outer-space police
force with carbon or CFC sensors properly tuned to identify earthly

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

See YANDLE, BOOTLEGGERS, supra note 119, at 3, 10-18.
See id. at 13-18
See id. at 3, 8-13, 18.
See id. at 3, 11, 18.
See id. at 3.
See Yandle, After Kyoto, supra note 119, at 24.
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poachers who illegally invade, destroy, and disturb the ozone layer
and climate stability. Perhaps a modern-day cowboy could peaceably
ride the line, keeping out poachers, and could send the bill to those
who exercise privately held rights to use global property. In either
case, low-cost monitoring technology must form the necessary bridge
that connects non-transferable common property to private property
with 3-D rights. So what are the possibilities for the global as well as
the earthly commons?
In a brief attempt to answer this question, the author asked some
of his students to scan the remote sensing technology frontier and report their findings. Dendy Macaulay, a sophomore economics major
126
at Clemson University, provided an interesting approach. Consider
first the emerging capabilities for identifying amounts and sources of
emissions in rivers, streams, and the earth’s atmosphere. Macaulay
introduced the possibility of genetically engineered bacteria equipped
with a bioluminescent gene.127 The bacteria illuminate when they encounter particular pollutants in water; the degree of illumination var128
ies directly with the pollution concentration. In addition to identifying the presence of pollution, the bacteria can track the pollution to
129
its source.
Additionally, satellite remote sensing capabilities can now provide photographs and source-identifying data on oil slicks and other
130
The combination of highpollutants, including thermal pollution.
tech bacteria and satellites offer the prospect of reliable, low-cost
131
monitoring of environmental use. Indeed, were it not for statutory
limitations, the combination could facilitate the resuscitation of common law and 3-D property rights on earth.
Despite these innovative approaches, 3-D property rights have
not yet effectively emerged. In fact, many unique 3-D property systems have failed to replace current systems, even when those systems
are much less effective. For example, the Stedman remote-sensing
gun for reading automobile tailpipe emissions has been around for

126. See Dendy Macaulay, Technology and Emerging Environmental Markets (Apr. 19,
1999) (unpublished ECON319 research paper, Clemson Univ.) (on file with author).
127. See Myrna E. Watanabe, Environmental Biotechnology Meetings Bring Developers,
Manufacturers, Users Together, 30 ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. 244A, 244A (1996).
128. Cf. id. at 244A-45A.
129. See Macaulay, supra note 126, at 9.
130. See id. at 14.
131. Cf. Watanabe, supra note 127, at 245A; Yandle, Environmental Regulation, supra note
5, at 160.

YANDLE_FINAL_PAGEPROOF2

42

DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM

09/13/00 9:05 AM

[Vol. 10:13

years.132 The device has been tested extensively and can accurately
read and record emissions at the rate of 1,500 cars per hour in 65 mile
133
per hour traffic. However, no matter how cheering these facts may
be, the EPA continues to cling to a mandatory system of inspections
and maintenance for ozone-troubled cities.134
The Stedman system is a proven technology that can identify
polluting vehicles and automatically send a summons or notice to the
135
registered owner; it is a system that allows holders of environmental
rights to be protected from poachers. But the Stedman system has
not been able to displace the higher cost, less effective, commandand-control inspection system that requires one hundred percent participation.136 Thus, the bridge that leads from common property rights
to public or even private property rights is present, but the gate is
closed. It appears that it may be more difficult to foster the evolutionary process on earth than it is on the high seas or in space.
IV. HUNTERS, GATHERERS, AND THE GLOBAL COMMONS: SOME
FINAL THOUGHTS
It is said, “A man’s reach must exceed his grasp or what’s a
137
heaven for?” The property rights institutions for earthly resources
were not developed easily. Consequently, when it comes to the heavens or the high seas, mankind must continue to grasp.
Cultural anthropologists and other scholars sometimes divide
human history into two periods that can be a useful distinction in the
138
There is the time of the hunter-gatherer
property rights context.
and then the food producer.139 The hunter-gatherer period is dominated by nomadic people who engage in a particular chase, whether it
be for animals, or fruit and berries.140 The latter time period, or that
132. See Rick Henserson, A Better Way to Catch Polluting Cars, CONSUMERS’ RES. MAG.,
July 1992, at 18, 18.
133. See id.
134. See K.H. JONES & JONATHAN H. ADLER, TIME TO REOPEN THE CLEAN AIR ACT
(Cato Inst., Pol’y Analysis Series No. 233, 1995), available at <http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa233.html>.
135. See Henerson, supra note 132, at 20.
136. See id. at 21 (stating that the EPA objects to the Stedman system because random
testing will not check every vehicle).
137. Robert Browning, in BARTLETT’S FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 466 (Justin Kaplan ed.,
16th ed. 1992) (1855).
138. For a strongly recommended discussion of this topic, see JARED DIAMOND, GUNS,
GERMS, AND STEEL: THE FATES OF HUMAN SOCIETIES (1997).
139. See id. at 86, 104-13, 354-56.
140. See id. at 86.
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of the food producer, is characterized by more advanced people who
have learned about animal husbandry and planting and harvesting
141
From the
and who settle down to form permanent communities.
point of view of property rights, the hunter-gatherer values common
access or common property, because enclosures and exclusive rights
pose problems for people and possessions moving across space. On
the other hand, the food producers value private property rights, because enclosures and exclusive rights increase wealth.
This was the dichotomy that separated America’s white Europe142
ans from many, but certainly not all, Indian tribes. As historian
Stephen Ambrose put it, “All that was needed to put the Indian on
the road to civilization was, in the words of Henry Knox, the Secretary of War in 1789, to give the Indian a love of exclusive property . . . . The Indians had a communal ideal and practice, while the
whites had an individual ideal and practice.”143 As has been clearly
evinced, the promoters of private property rights won in the struggle
over western lands and territories. But that was just one struggle at
one point in time, and it was not a total victory for property rights enthusiasts.
Although exclusive 3-D property rights evolved for large portions of western land, they were not developed for heavenly assets,
such as air. Furthermore, while the progeny of some of the white
Europeans and later settlers assumed their ‘advanced’ roles as food
producers and permanent community builders, others continued to
ply the high seas where common access continued to rule as the desired form of property rights. Eventually, the descendents of these
people would orbit the earth and stake out the moon not with 3-D
property rights but with the Indian-like notion of common access. In
many ways, the advanced food producers are still much like the
hunter-gatherers.
So, at any moment in time, there are multiple property rights
margins that matter to a particular people, whether they are huntergathers, food producers, white Europeans, or Native American
tribesmen. At the intensive margin, 3-D property rights evolve for
certain resources because the benefits outweigh the costs. However,

141. See id. at 104-13.
142. See Robert Higgs, Legally Induced Technical Regress in the Washington Salmon Fishery, 7 RES. ECON. HIST. 55, 58-60 (1982) (describing an aboriginal fishery that “rested on the
enforcement of clearly understood property rights” and stating that “the Indians possessed a
well-developed property system in the fishery”).
143. STEPHEN E. AMBROSE, CRAZY HORSE AND CUSTER 31 (1975).
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these same rights will be denied in another place because of their cost
or, regardless of their efficiency, because of the politics of special interests. At the extensive margin, where exploration is still occurring
and the cost of defining and defending a resource is unaffordable, the
commons remains unsullied by the rule of law and markets. In between these margins, there are mixtures, hybrids, and evolving property rights. As costs fall and scarcity values increase, these margins
continue to shift. Eventually, even resources that are currently understood to be part of the global commons will become subject to 3-D
property rights.

